One of the areas that has significantly developed in recent years is tort claims against the manufacturer of a defective product. In many other cases, third-party notices are filed by a defendant—such as an employer or possessor of an item—against the product manufacturer, due to an accident involving an employee or user of that product. In recent years, there has been a growing number of inquiries to the “Experts Forum” from attorneys seeking expert opinions to help establish the liability—or lack thereof—of a manufacturer, whether sued directly or through a third-party notice filed by the defendant (the employer or the product possessor). The Defective Products Liability Law, 1980, which defines the manufacturer’s strict liability in certain cases, outlines who is considered a manufacturer, what constitutes a defective product, and what defenses are available to the manufacturer.

Below is a small selection of case law examples regarding manufacturer liability, both under the Defective Products Liability Law and according to the Torts Ordinance.

Lawn Mower
A man was operating a lawn mower when the blade struck a foreign object in the grass, causing part of the blade to break off and injure a passerby. It was found that the blade broke due to a one-time overload caused by the impact with the foreign object while the mower was in use. The court held the manufacturer liable for failing to take sufficient safety measures, such as reinforcing the blade to prevent it from breaking and detaching upon contact with a hard object, and for failing to install a protective guard that would stop any broken parts from being forcefully ejected. After the accident, following a demand by the Ministry of Labor, a guard was added to the mower, and the kibbutz (manufacturer) switched to producing blades forged in one piece with the shaft—reducing the risk of blade fragment detachment.

These safety measures were known even before the accident, and there was no justification for not implementing them during production. Moreover, about three weeks before the accident, and in response to previous incidents, the kibbutz had already committed to correcting defects in the mower, as required by the Ministry of Labor. However, despite being aware of the risks associated with earlier mower models, the kibbutz did not notify the owners of such mowers to bring them in for repair. It should be noted that the claim was filed under general negligence law, not under the Defective Products Liability Law, and therefore liability under that law was not discussed. Liability was also assigned to the mower operator, who, despite knowing the risk of the blade striking a hard object and breaking, was negligent in inspecting the area where he planned to mow—an inspection that could have identified the object responsible for the blade's breakage. {C.A. 532/89, 534 Kibbutz Nir David v. Miriam Shukron et al. (P.D. 46(2) 221)}

Guillotine Machine for Sheet Metal Cutting
An employee working with a guillotine machine for cutting sheet metal was injured when the blade came down on his fingers. The District Court held the employer liable in tort for operating the metal-cutting blade without the protective guard, despite it being a dangerous part of the machine. It was proven that had the guard been installed as per the manufacturer’s instructions—5–6 mm above the feed table—the operator’s fingers would not have been able to reach the blade’s path, making the existing safety mechanism effective. However, the guard had been removed from the machine long before the accident. The employer also failed to fulfill his duty to instruct the plaintiff on safe working methods near the guillotine and to prohibit operating the machine without the guard.
The third-party notice filed by the employer against the manufacturer was rejected. The court ruled that Section 2(a) of the Defective Products Liability Law obligates a manufacturer to compensate someone who has suffered bodily injury. The employer, who filed the third-party claim, did not suffer bodily harm but financial damage resulting from his obligation to compensate the plaintiff—financial damage that the law does not intend to cover. Therefore, the employer has no cause of action against the manufacturer under the Defective Products Liability Law.
The tort-based claim against the manufacturer was also dismissed. The court found that the employer failed to prove that the guillotine was defective or that the guard provided by the manufacturer—later removed by the employer—would not have prevented the fingers from entering the danger zone. On the contrary, the manufacturer successfully demonstrated that the guard was installed 5 mm above the table surface—a gap through which fingers cannot pass—making it a proper and lawful guard.
It was further proven that the guard was attached with bolts that required a special wrench and the cooperation of two people to remove—meaning it was a securely fastened guard, not easily removed by any employee. {C.C. (Tel Aviv) 1147/90 Adamov v. Polaris (Takdin–District 96(4), 998)}

Scaffold
The deceased died in a workplace accident when a scaffold he was standing on collapsed while painting a crane. His estate sued both his employers and the scaffold manufacturer. It was found that the scaffold's structure was defective and unstable, and it overturned either because one of its legs slipped into a groove in the crane's rail track during movement, or because its balance was disrupted when the deceased’s assistant climbed the scaffold holding a paint bucket, and the deceased bent down to receive it—or due to both factors combined. The court ruled that the scaffold manufacturer was liable for releasing a defective product, failing to test its stability, and failing to warn users of the inherent dangers. The manufacturer was assigned 70% of the liability.

The employer was held 30% liable because the scaffold was already found to be defective upon arrival, and the manufacturer’s workers had to repair it by adding diagonal supports. This should have raised concern on the employer’s part regarding the reliability of the manufacturer, and the employer should have had the scaffold inspected by an expert to assess its stability. The scaffold had undergone refurbishment by the manufacturer and arrived at the site disassembled; it was reassembled by the employer’s workers. However, no inspection of its stability was carried out after the repairs and reassembly—thus breaching the employer’s duty to provide safe and proper equipment.

The court added that the employer should have secured the scaffold to the crane, as it was made of aluminum—light and mobile, but less stable than wooden scaffolds or those anchored to the ground, especially when placed on uneven surfaces. The employer was also negligent in failing to take this safety measure. {C.A. 582/71 et al., National Insurance Institute v. Port Authority et al. (P.D. 27(1), 650)}

Wooden Board
An employee at a carpentry shop was cutting a sandwich wood panel with a circular saw plate cutter when a metal pin embedded in the wood suddenly flew into his eye. The District Court ruled that liability for the accident should be shared equally between the plaintiff’s employer and the manufacturer of the wooden boards, in one of which the pin was found. The employer was obligated to instruct and warn the employee, provide protective goggles, and supervise their use—measures that were only implemented after the accident.

As for the board manufacturer, the court determined that the manufacturer was aware of the risk of metal pins remaining in the wood and knew the boards would be cut in carpentry shops. Despite knowing that cutting a board containing metal pins posed a danger, the manufacturer failed to warn the carpentry shop owners. This failure to issue a warning was sufficient to establish negligence. The risk was known, and the manufacturer was obliged to warn purchasers—either with a warning leaflet or by marking the panels with an identifying label. {C.C. (Be’er Sheva) 225/90 Gabi Levi v. Shabtai Bechar et al. (unpublished)}

Bottle
A 10-year-old boy attempted to open a carbonated beverage bottle manufactured by Tempo. When he struggled to open it, he tried several times using force—first with pliers and then with his teeth. Eventually, the cap was dislodged and struck his eye. The bottle’s neck had a thread of approximately 630 degrees. Perpendicular to the threading were four grooves designed to release internal pressure during opening. The bottle cap was made of aluminum with an inner plastic sealing layer, and a special tamper-evident ring that peels off upon first opening. Special machines roll the aluminum cap to match the threading on the bottle neck.

According to testimony, the opening torque of the caps was tested several times during each shift. Since this is a destructive test, it was performed only on a sample basis. However, if a bottle was found improperly sealed, the capping process was halted, and a mechanic checked and adjusted the sealing machines. The batch of bottles between the last two tests was collected. After sealing, the bottles were transferred to heating tunnels, where they pressed against each other in a pasteurization tunnel—raising the internal pressure in each bottle to about 5 atmospheres. It is assumed that under such pressure, any improperly sealed cap would detach.

The gas content in the beverages was below the maximum allowed by the Israeli standard, and this was verified every 30 minutes. The cap was designed to be opened with a reasonable amount of force by any person. The grooves on the bottle neck were meant to release the internal pressure without exerting force on the cap. As long as the thread wasn’t disengaged, the cap couldn’t pop upwards. Examination of the specific bottle showed that the cap was damaged, likely due to being opened with a sharp tool. Using a tool to open the cap distorts its geometry, which can cause the cap to spontaneously detach from the bottle instead of releasing pressure properly through the grooves.

The court ruled that the plaintiff failed to prove the specific negligence attributed to the defendant, and that the conditions for applying Sections 41 and 38 of the Torts Ordinance were not met, as it was not established that the defect occurred while the bottle was under the defendant’s control. Testimonies indicated the issue arose while the plaintiff was handling the bottle. There was no evidence that the damage to the cap had occurred earlier, during the time it was under the defendant’s control.

Regarding the Defective Products Liability Law, the District Court ruled that the manufacturer was entitled to the defense provided under Section 4(a), which presumes that if the manufacturer proves the product underwent reasonable safety checks before leaving its control, it is assumed the defect occurred after the product left the manufacturer. In this case, it was not only proven that the product had undergone such safety checks, but also that it was plausible the defect was caused while the product was in the plaintiff’s possession and during an impulsive attempt to apply extreme physical force to the already-damaged cap.

Therefore, there is no basis to determine that the bottle left the defendant’s factory sealed with a defective cap, and the claim is dismissed. {C.C. (Be’er Sheva) 390/89 Rami Bracha v. Tempo Beer Industries Ltd. (Takdin–District 95(1), 396)}

Lounge Chair
A man sat on a lounge chair manufactured by the defendant, which he had purchased a year earlier. While holding the armrests to recline the chair, he lifted them, and as the chair began to tilt backward, his finger got caught in the track and was injured. The manufacturer was found negligent for producing a chair with a hidden safety hazard: a wide track (part of the reclining mechanism) that could trap the user’s fingers. The court also noted the lack of adequate warnings to users about this trap within the track.

This was the first ruling in Israel to address a design defect, which is considered a type of defect that falls under the manufacturer’s liability for harm caused to users of its products. The Supreme Court emphasized that this was a latent defect, as the track located beneath the armrests was not visible to the user. Therefore, if the risk could not have been avoided by installing a narrower track or adding a protective cover on the armrest side, the manufacturer was at least obligated to provide a proper warning regarding the hidden danger. By failing to take any of these measures, the manufacturer was held negligent under the Torts Ordinance.

The plaintiff was assigned 35% contributory negligence, as he was aware of the presence of a metallic mechanism at the base of the armrests and understood its function after using the chair for a year. Although he did not know about the wide track where his finger was caught, his knowledge of the metallic mechanism should have made him more cautious in his movements and prevented contact with it. His careless grip contributed to the incident and justified the apportionment of fault. {C.A. 557/77, 594 M. Shefs v. Prima Prizner & Co. Ltd. (P.D. 32(3), 119)}

This ruling was issued prior to the enactment of the Defective Products Liability Law, 1980.

Ladder
The plaintiff was instructed by his employer to install an advertising sign. For this, he climbed a single-sided ladder manufactured by “Sullamot Hagit,” leaning it against a wall while his manager supported it, and began drilling work at a height of 2.5 meters. Suddenly, the ladder slipped, and the plaintiff fell and was injured.

He sued his employer, who filed a third-party notice against the ladder manufacturer. The court found the employer liable, stating that the method used to perform the work—standing on a single-sided leaning ladder while carrying out a physically demanding task—was not an appropriate work method. Given the height involved, the plaintiff should have stood on a proper work platform, not on a ladder susceptible to slipping.

The third-party claim against the manufacturer was rejected. First, the court held that the employer failed to prove—via receipt, invoice, or any other document—that the ladder from which the plaintiff fell was indeed purchased from the third party. Second, it was determined that no defect in the ladder had been proven. Moreover, safety instructions regarding ladder use were clearly labeled on the product, and the employer did not take steps to draw the worker’s attention to the proper use of the ladder according to those instructions. {C.C. (Nazareth) 1554/94 Kazanovich Mark v. Graphics 88 et al. (Takdin–District 96(3), 3894)}

Bicycle
The plaintiff was rding his bicycle home from school when the fork connecting the front wheel to the bicycle frame—via a pivot that continues into the handlebars—suddenly broke. As a result, the plaintiff fell to the ground and was injured. The bicycle importer claimed in its defense that excessive force had been applied to the bike and that the accident resulted from poor maintenance and careless riding.
The Magistrate’s Court rejected this claim, as the defendant failed to provide an expert opinion to prove that the fork had broken due to excessive force applied to the bicycle.

The court ruled that the fact the accident occurred one year after the bicycle was purchased raises questions about the strength of the broken part. Even if the plaintiff rode fast or recklessly, as teenagers often do, the court held that a bicycle should be manufactured with sufficient durability to withstand such use. A situation of "material fatigue" should not occur after only one year of daily use, which indicates a manufacturing defect. Even if no specific flaw in the bicycle could be clearly identified, the fact that the fork broke at a welded joint only a year after purchase creates a presumption that the bicycle was defective. This shifts the burden of proof to the manufacturer under the Defective Products Liability Law, requiring it to prove the applicability of one of the statutory defenses.

The defendant argued, under Section 4 of the Law, that the bicycle had undergone reasonable safety testing before leaving its control. The court rejected this argument, ruling that a sample-based safety inspection conducted by the Standards Institute was insufficient to prove that the defect in the specific bicycle occurred after it had left the manufacturer’s control. The importer was therefore held liable for the plaintiff’s damages. {C.C. (Afula) 3553/97 (Minor) v. [Name not provided]}

Reasonable Safety Testing
One of the main defenses available to a manufacturer under the Defective Products Liability Law is found in Section 4(a)(1), which provides that if the manufacturer proves the specific product underwent reasonable safety testing before it left their control, a presumption arises that the damage was caused by a defect that occurred afterward. The court examined the question of what constitutes "reasonable safety testing," and whether sample testing is sufficient to establish this presumption. In Fenicia v. Amar (C.A. 166/88, 184, P.D. 45(2) 457), it was ruled that sample-based safety testing is insufficient, as it does not prove that the specific product that caused the damage actually underwent testing. The same principle was applied in Fenicia v. Itzhak Household Industries {C.A. (Tel Aviv) 1568/99, unpublished}.

In these cases, the manufacturer was held liable, and the court rejected the claim that reasonable safety testing had been conducted. It was ruled that sample testing is inadequate, and the very occurrence of the accident indicates that each and every jar must be tested in order to relieve a manufacturer of liability. Similarly, in the Koreshidi case (summarized earlier), the court reiterated that sample testing is not sufficient to prove that the defect in the specific bicycle occurred after the product left the manufacturer’s control. In contrast, in Rami Bracha v. Tempo (summarized earlier), the District Court accepted sample testing as sufficient, due to the destructive nature of the test, and ruled that the manufacturer had proven the product underwent reasonable safety checks. As a result, the claim against the manufacturer was dismissed.

Third-Party Notice Against the Manufacturer 
An employer who is sued by an employee due to an injury caused by a defective product or machine may file a third-party notice against the manufacturer under the Torts Ordinance. However, according to case law, the employer may not file a third-party notice under the Defective Products Liability Law, since the employer does not qualify as an “injured party” who sustained bodily harm. This was held in Adamov v. Polaris (summarized above), as well as in Kadmian v. Khanukov {C.C. (Be’er Sheva) 240/91, Takdin–District 95(1), 713}. In contrast, under Section 7 of the Law, a manufacturer who is sued may file a third-party notice against another manufacturer involved in the product’s manufacturing process. This was the case in Fenicia v. Itzhak Household Industries (referenced above).

Conclusion

In this information sheet, we have selected a sample of court rulings—out of many dozens available on this subject—to highlight the potential, in many cases, for involving the manufacturer in liability or filing a direct claim against them. We have seen the immense importance of an expert opinion, which can serve as a basis for establishing—or refuting—the manufacturer’s liability. We would be happy to assist you in other areas of tort claims as well, with the help of the wide range of highly professional, reliable, and skilled experts working with the Experts Forum, each specializing in their respective field. Finally, we are pleased to announce the publication of a new tort law book: "Liability for Accidents in Public Areas" (by Attorney Y. Pal-Hazan and D. Engel). As detailed in the attached information sheet, this book will serve as an effective and practical tool for tort lawyers, containing hundreds of case summaries—both published and unpublished—organized by the various subjects of tort claims.

Additionally, toward the end of the calendar year, the first update to the book "Liability for Workplace Injuries" (by D. Engel, Attorney Y. Pal-Hazan, and Engineer G. Engel) is also scheduled for release.

The information was prepared by Attorney Yael Pal-Hazan.